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ABSTRACT 
In this paper recognition is taken to be a question of social ontology, 
regarding the very constitution of the social space of interaction. It 
will be argued that recognitive powers are constitutive powers more 
basic than deontic ones and play a role much broader than the one 
they in fact assume in Searle and in Brandom.  
KEYWORDS: Searle, Brandom, Hegel, Recognition, Deontic Power 
 
 
I. A metaphor? 
 
What are we talking about when we talk about recognition? My observations regard some expressions that are very 
often to be found in philosophical discourses inspired by the Hegelian theory of Anerkennung. For example it is claimed 
that theoretical and practical self-consciousness have an intersubjective structure insofar as they are constituted through 
recognitive interactions; or that right (Recht) is a recognitive phenomenon insofar as it presupposes diverse forms of 
reciprocal recognition between individuals. When we speak of recognitive constitution of the structure of self-
consciousness or of social institutions such as right or the State, are we merely using of vague and indefinite images or 
is this conceptual vocabulary to be taken seriously by theorists? These observations by no means intend to resolve and 
exhaust the full extension of the theories of recognition but, rather, limit themselves to capturing a specific but 
important aspect of the question. 
 
The problem I intend to deal with is, in particular, the following: if we take these manners of speaking seriously, then 
should we not maintain that they speak to us of the mode of being of some phenomena, i.e., of how determinate aspects 
of their ontology are constituted through interaction?  
 
II. Axes of recognition 
 
To get my bearings in the tangle of recognizing, preliminarily I shall introduce a distinction between three axes or 
dimensions of recognition that converge in part with Paul Ricoeur's study.
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 We can thus distinguish between three 
dimensions of recognizing: 
 
1. Reidentification: identification and perceptual reidentification of objects on the part of a subject; 
2. Self-recognition: relation to self of a subject, of a type that is both reidentificative and performative/attestative; 
3. Reciprocal recognition: relation between two or more agents who coordinate their interaction by reciprocally 
identifying one another, attesting their identity and referring themselves to variously codified norms of behavior 
(functional, implicit, informal, formal). The reciprocity of the relation has to be kept distinct from symmetry and from 
  
equality: symmetrical relations and relations between equals simply two subsets of relations of reciprocal recognition. 
 
III. Relational structure of recognition 
 
When we speak of recognition, in these three senses, we always speak of it as some type of relation: relation between a 
subject and an object, self-relation of a subject, relation between two subjects; it appears, moreover, that we are dealing 
with intentional relations. Furthermore, the theories of recognition that I intend to discuss assume, in some sense of the 
term, the logical priority of the third axis (reciprocal recognition): it is assumed that the integration between the three 
dimensions of recognizing come about through the subsumption of the first and second levels in the third, that is, 
through the subsumption of reidentification of objects and self-recognition under reciprocal recognition. The 
constitutive function is in fact assigned to the third axis, i.e., to the relations of reciprocal recognition: it is these 
relations that constitute those holistic properties of the individual which we term theoretical and practical self-
consciousness, as well as social realities such as right or the State. The relations that constitute these phenomena are 
understood, then, as relations of reciprocal dependence.
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The subjects of such relations are not necessarily singular individuals: they may, rather, be social realities  sui generis or 
even collective entities (families, clans, classes, States). Recognitive relations of dependence appear to presuppose the 
presence in individuals of powers or capacities that are constituted, enabled and exercised within the relation itself. And 
in this regard we ought to ask: a) whether the relations are simply conditions of enablement to exercise powers already 
possessed; or b) whether they are co-constitutive (in the absence of such relations, these powers not only could not be 
exercised, but could not be developed or would end up by irremediably wasting away: it is thus the recognitive relation 
of dependence that permits us to enable specific functions with which we are naturally endowed and then to develop 
them into powers or capacities);
3
 or whether c) they create the powers ex nihilo. 
 
IV. Socio-ontological approach 
 
At this point I would like to frame the question I posed at the beginning somewhat better. If we are not talking in vain, 
when we speak of recognitive constitution: 
 
1. we are dealing with an ontological question; 
2. we are dealing with a question of social ontology; 
3. the question regards the very constitution of the social space. 
 
This social-ontological approach could be put to the test of an interpretation of the Hegelian texts, for example of 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Here in fact Hegel assumes that certain social and institutional phenomena – 
holistic properties of individuals or social entities sui generis – are generated by free will; accordingly, he analyzes this 
process of constitution in terms of the recognitive relations which are the infrastructure of the development and 
implementation of free will: this is the case with the legal, moral, ethical person, as well as with institutions of the 
family, of right, of civil society and of the State.
4
 But this exegetic question oversteps the bounds I have set myself. 
Rather, I would like to concentrate on the question of whether certain aspects of the theory of recognition can be 
  
translated into the terms of a socio-ontological paradigm: to do so, I shall make use of some conceptual tools derived 
from John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality.
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V. First approximation 
 
As a first approximation, we may attempt to translate the vocabulary of recognition into a socio-ontological paradigm in 
the following Searlean terms: 
 
1. Certain holistic properties of individuals and social realities sui generis are social phenomena – ontologically 
subjective or, more precisely, ontologically intersubjective – insofar as they do not exist independently of the existence 
of a certain type of interaction: which is to say, they do not exist independently of a certain type of interaction 
characterized by recognitive relations. 
2. Recognitive relations can be characterized in terms of rules. 
3. Such rules are not limited to regulating already-existing phenomena or behavior, but rather make new phenomena or 
behavior possible; we refer, then, not to regulative rules, but rather to constitutive rules (like the rules of chess) that 
have the following form: "X counts as Y in C". 
4. The recognitive powers that individuals are enabled to exercise in an interaction are in the final analysis deontic 
powers, i.e., powers that make it possible to regulate the interaction between individuals and that consist in the power to 
impose and/or to assume responsibilities, rights, obligations, titles, authorizations, permits. 
5. Since deontic powers appear to imply the faculty of language essentially – we cannot impose rights or obligations 
without words, symbols, markers; furthermore, even if certain norms can be followed unconsciously, to be such it must 
in principle be possible for them to be made explicit linguistically by someone – the recognitive powers are themselves 
essentially linked to the linguistic faculty. 
 
VI. Constitutive powers  
 
If, for the sake of argument, we grant that this translation is acceptable, we will have succeeded in three things: First, 
we have characterized recognition in wholly normative terms. Second, we have defined the ontology of recognition as a 
normative ontology. Third, we have succeeded in assimilating recognitive powers to deontic powers. 
 
In what follows I shall endeavor to make it clear whether this characterization is satisfactory. In particular, the 
underlying questions in my analysis will be the following: 
 
a. what type of constitutive power – here understood as a power to constitute or concur in constituting some phenomena 
– are recognitive powers? 
b. does the nexus between recognition, language and interaction in human practice
6
 really mean that recognitive powers 
and deontic powers can be assimilated? 
c. and do deontic powers necessarily have to be modeled on linguistic powers? 
 
VII. Nonhuman social space 
  
 
To tackle at least some of these questions I shall begin with the idea that sociality is not just a specifically human 
feature. The idea, which has a long tradition – from Aristotle to Hegel, to Marx and to contemporary sociobiology – has 
two aspects: 
 
1. Other forms of animal life characterized by sociality exist. The tendency to cooperate is a natural trait of many 
species and is, at least, no less natural than the non-cooperative tendency; and, on the other hand, also the aggressive 
traits of animal behavior are not in themselves antisocial but can depend on cooperative forms of social behavior (rites 
of courtship, aggressiveness as a naturally selected trait of the dominant male that sacrifices itself for the group). 
2. Human sociality is not a mere cultural construction but is a natural trait of our biological form of  life. The cultural 
elaboration of sociality is itself in part a product of adaptation to the environment, and cultural differences of this kind 
can be found also in animal species.
7
 
 
 
VIII. The presuppositions of social facts 
 
From this standpoint it is perfectly legitimate to speak of nonhuman social spaces. But I wish to tackle the problem 
directly in terms of social ontology. In fact also Searle admits that sociality is linked to biological nature and maintains 
that also other animals have the power to constitute social facts. What, then, are the presuppositions of the constitution 
of not specifically human social spaces brought to light by Searle? 
These presuppositions
8
 can be listed as follows: 
 
1. interaction; 
2. cooperation; 
3. collective intentionality (desires, beliefs) as a medium of coordination of the cooperation; 
4. capacity of assigning (i.e. attributing) functions to objects on the basis of their physical properties. 
 
On the basis of these presuppositions it is possible to understand, according to Searle, how in animal groups such social 
phenomena are constituted as, for example, the use of tools, cooperative behavior in the raising of offspring, in hunting, 
in courtship and in coupling, the institution of hierarchical relations and of dominance, and so forth. 
 
IX. First intermediate observation 
 
Engaging in these forms of complex cooperative behavior would not be possible without presupposing the capacity of 
sharing intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. From this standpoint all facts that imply the shared 
intentionality of a plurality of agents are social facts. I do not intend to dwell here on the question of how such shared 
intentionality is to be understood: whether as an individual social entity of a new type (and whether Hegel asserted a 
thesis of this kind, as Searle accuses);
9
 or, as Searle would have it, as a collective intentionality sui generis, biologically 
primitive but to be understood as a form that individual intentionality can assume rather than as a new type of individual 
entity; or, again, as reducible to the intentionality of individuals and to their reciprocal beliefs ("I believe that you 
  
believe that I believe that..."). What I wish to emphasize in this context is that, in fact, this shared intentionality 
intersects all the axes of recognition. In fact the agents, to be able to cooperate, have to: 
 
1. recognize objects: be able, perceptively, to identify and reidentify the objects of the environment with which they 
interact; 
2. recognize themselves: be capable of self-identification within the environment with which they interact and of 
attesting their own presence and role within cooperative behavior; 
3. recognize one another: identify and reidentify themselves as belonging to the same species, to the same herd, as 
sexual or cooperative partners; and regulate their own adaptation to the environment and their own cooperative behavior 
on the basis of norms followed instinctually or learned through education. 
 
The shared intentionality that is the basis of the constitution of social facts is thus most definitely entwined with 
recognitive relations even where it does not appear to be in the presence of the phenomenon of human linguistic self-
consciousness. The intentional capacities that make social cooperation possible appear, moreover, to require recognitive 
capacities of a different kind. In the strong sense this thesis could mean that such recognitive capacities are essential for  
defining the intentional capacities of the cooperative agents. Here arises the further hypothesis – which I will discuss 
later – that reciprocal recognitive relations have priority and play a co-constitutive role not only in human self-
conscious intentionality, but also in (individual and shared) animal intentionality This, of course, would mean 
abandoning Searle's idea
10
 that intentionality is constitutive with respect to social facts but is not, in its turn, a social fact 
(but is, rather, an intrinsic feature): indeed, on the basis of this further hypothesis intentionality itself would come to be 
co-constituted recognitively.  
 
X. Human social space 
 
At this point I would like to return to Searle, to try to see what he views as the basic presuppositions of the ontology of 
human social space. For Searle, the distinguishing feature of human social space is that it contains institutional facts – 
language, exchange, money, right, State – that are not to be found in other animal societies.11 The necessary 
presuppositions for understanding the constitution of these institutional – and therefore specifically human – social facts 
are, for Searle, the following: 
 
1. capacity of attributing functions through collective intentionality; 
2. capacity of attributing status functions through collective intentionality: these are functions that an object cannot 
perform only in virtue of its physical features; such causal features of the object can be necessary but are not sufficient 
to determine the function; 
3. collective recognition: a status function exists as such insofar as it (its type or in certain cases its token) is 
(collectively or individually) accepted by the participants in the interaction (note that acceptance is not in itself free and 
rational and may come in degrees); 
4. constitutive rules: social phenomena are constituted through rules that do not regularize preexisting behavior but 
rather produce new behavior; 
5. deontic powers: the power of producing social phenomena through constitutive rules is thus presupposed. Such a 
  
power is here understood as a deontic one insofar as it is a matter of rights, obligations, authorizations etc;
12
 
6. recognition/acceptance of deontic power: deontic power does not exist independently of collective recognition, of 
acceptance of its being in force; 
7. linguistic powers: language is constitutive with respect to deontic power; furthermore, language is in its turn a social 
institution that plays a constitutive role with respect to other institutions.
13
 
 
XI. Second intermediate observation 
 
Here are some remarks that connect Searle's analysis to the theme of recognition, and which show that these phenomena 
are found in animal interaction as well. 
 
The first presupposition makes reference to a capacity that, if we look closely, is not limited to humans. The capacity of 
imposing functions on objects on the basis of their physical properties ---for example the capacity to use certain objects 
as tools – can in fact play a role in animal cooperative behavior and can be transmitted intergenerationally.14 In these 
cases, then, one should be ready to say that the attributing of functions comes about through collective intentionality.
15
 
 
The capacity of attributing a status function is not specifically human. Structures of rank, hierarchical relations of 
dominance, which are established in certain animal groups, presuppose the attributing of status functions – for example, 
the status of dominant male – that can be modified over time also through conflict. By the same token, the intrinsic 
nexus between status function and acceptance of that function – the fact that they are ontologically dependent on 
recognition – is not specifically human (and since acceptance has different degrees, this does not imply the 
presupposition of free and rational non- human agents). Nor is the status of leader of the herd determined only by 
physical characteristics of the object on which it is imposed but has to be collectively accepted to be such, and in this 
regard situations of recognitive conflict are possible. 
 
The status function attributed to certain individuals is connected with the exercise of powers of imposing certain forms 
of behavior on other individuals, in terms of obligations, responsibilities, authorizations. Such powers cannot be 
assimilated to brute force – even though they may make use of it – since they do presuppose some form of acceptance 
in order to be exercised.
16
 We might speak here of a lower threshold of deontic constitutive powers. Since the 
attributing of status functions follows the form "X counts as Y in C," it could be maintained, as regards lower-threshold 
constitutive powers connected with the exercise of such status functions, that they refer to constitutive rules. 
 
XII. Collective intentionality and recognition 
 
In general, with regard to Searle, my strategy has been to show that recognitive phenomena, which he isolates at the 
level of human interaction, are, rather, in part proper to animal interaction as well. Furthermore, this gives rise to the 
fact that recognitive relations play a constitutive role much broader than the one they in fact assume in Searle's theory 
of acceptance. This, moreover, could have consequences as far as the very conception of individual and collective 
intentionality is concerned, since it could be assumed that at least the collective form of animal intentionality is 
constituted recognitively through the recognitive powers with which individuals are naturally endowed and which are 
  
activated and develop in interaction. Recognitive relations would thus be a sort of middle term between collective 
intentionality and individual intentionality: and the latter may itself not be intelligible independently of collective 
intentionality and of its recognitive constitution, proving to be mediated by it. In this sense the  notion of recognition 
would serve to render intelligible the very notion of intentionality. And this could be a starting point also on the path to 
a noncircular explanation of the intentionality that is accompanied by linguistic self-consciousness: the thesis for which 
individual self-consciousness would be a holistic property constituted through recognitive relations. 
 
XIII. Consequences: the recognitive background 
 
At this point I would like to draw some conclusions that derive from the preceding analyses: 
 
1. The recognitive relations mediated by language are a subset of recognitive relations as a whole. 
2. Nonlinguistic recognitive relations are constitutive of social phenomena. 
3. Hence recognitive powers do not coincide with linguistic powers. 
4. Recognitive relations are not wholly normative, at least in the sense of linguistic normativity. If there is a sense in 
speaking of behavior guided by norms in the case of animal cooperative behavior, then it is in a different sense of 
normativity – natural functional norms that have different degrees (ranging from homeostatic capacities of interacting 
with the environment and organizing it on one's own scale, to instinctual norms of cooperation, up to norms that have 
been learned but that cannot be made linguistically explicit, in the current state, by the participants in an interaction, and 
that presuppose some kind of acceptance, even if not a free and rational one, in contrast with social norms requiring free 
acknowledgement). 
5. Hence recognitive powers are not in themselves deontic powers in the sense understood by Searle and Brandom,
17
 or 
deontic powers cannot be assimilated tout court to linguistic powers as nonlinguistic constitutive rules do exist. 
 
These conclusions can be generalized by asserting that: 
 
6. Some recognitive capacities are first natural possessions common to human beings and to other animal species. 
7. Recognition that is culturally acquired, mediated by language and self-conscious, presupposes the existence of other 
nonreflexive lower recognitive capacities and would be impossible without them. 
8. Reflexive and linguistic forms of recognition can themselves be exercised insofar as, through repetition and practice, 
they come to be incorporated in an immediate and nonreflexive form and thus come to function as second nature, out of 
habit: being the result of a process of development and social construction does not prevent them from acting as second 
nature, that is with a spontaneity and immediacy analogous to that of the simply instinctual and genetically programmed 
first natural processes. As Hegel maintained: "Thinking, too, however free and active in its own pure element it 
becomes, no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of immediacy) ... It is through this habit that 
I come to realize my existence as a thinking being. Even here, in this spontaneity of self-centered thought, there is a 
partnership of soul and body (hence, want of habit and too-long-continued thinking cause headache)".
18
 
 
In The Construction of Social Reality Searle broached the notion of "background," by which he means that set of 
capacities, i.e. of dispositions, abilities, practical tendencies and nonintentional – or protointentional – uses which 
  
permit intentional states to function and which consist in a set of causal structures.
19
 Making reference to that notion, 
we could now maintain that the intentional and reflexive structures of recognition presuppose a set of nonreflexive and 
protointentional recognitive structures as a causal condition of their functioning. The notion of recognition, then, must 
in my view be included in the background: that is, recognition is operative not only in reflexive attitudes but also in 
their background; this also accounts for the cognitive function, noted by Searle himself, by which the aspect of 
familiarity with which nonpathological forms of consciousness present themselves would be a function of the capacities 
of the background.
20
 The background in fact makes recognitive familiarity with aspects of the world possible precisely 
insofar as it is constituted by recognitive capacities – both merely first natural ones, i.e. genetically programmed and 
instinctual capacities, and second natural ones, i.e. capacities shaped through cultural habituation
21
 – that function in an 
immediate way and that are thus endowed with causal power.
22
 
 
XIV. Approaches to recognition 
 
What, then, is the legitimate approach to the phenomenon of recognition? I shall endeavor to show how there are a 
number of legitimate approaches, each one of which takes into consideration an aspect of the phenomenon. I find 
illegitimate, however, the approach that, absolutizing one of these levels, ends up denying the phenomenon in its 
complexity and thus distorting it. 
 
1. Naturalistic approach. It is most definitely legitimate to study the phenomenon of recognition from a naturalistic 
standpoint. After all, it is a fact connected with our biological first nature that we are endowed with recognitive 
capacities, both with the lower capacities and with the higher ones connected with language. It is a fact of first nature 
by which we avail ourselves of an organism and functions that, if developed socially through education and stabilized 
through habit, allow us to avail ourselves of certain capacities with the immediacy of a second nature. The interweaving 
of recognitive first and second nature constitutes the background of all human practices. 
 
2. Anthropological approach. Even though recognitive functions and capacities are in part shared with other animals, 
they find in human beings a notable increase in degree that makes us strong recognizers. In some respects we may think 
of a qualitative leap that, however, is produced by a quantitative increase, and that allows us to deploy linguistic, 
reflexive and normative capacities. Thus an anthropological approach, designed to discover the sense in which 
recognition is the fundamental constitutive need of human nature, is legitimate: it is the idea expressed by Hegel, that 
"Man is recognition" ("Der Mensch ist Anerkennung"),
23
 both in the sense of that which he is to begin with – Hegel 
himself knew that there are first natural recognitive capacities that we share with animals
24
 – and in the sense of that 
which he has to become, by developing those forms of normative, reflexive, and linguistic self-conscious recognition 
that are so important for the constitution of the institutional sphere of spirit. 
 
3. Ontological approach. The characterization of human nature in recognitive terms can also be understood as an 
ontological characterization regarding man's mode of being, which is to say, as an ontology of the human. On the other 
hand, in light of the breadth of the phenomenon of recognition that we have envisioned, it is also clear that the 
ontological role played by recognitive powers is wider than a mere ontology of the human and regards more generally 
an ontology of sociality. 
  
 
4. Pragmatic approach. The ontological function of recognitive powers cannot itself be defined independently of a 
pragmatic analysis of the interaction of social agents. Here, we have the problem of how this pragmatics of recognition 
is to be modeled. Since at a certain level recognitive powers intersect with deontic powers, it follows that (a) certain 
recognitive phenomena, even if not all of them, will have to be examined in the framework of a normative pragmatics; 
and (b) furthermore the normative pragmatics adequate to analyze the phenomenon will not always be a pragmatics 
modeled on linguistic norms, if we assume the sensibleness of the idea that natural or prelinguistic norms of interaction 
can exist. 
 
XV. On Brandom's Pragmatics: Model I 
 
The necessity of an integration of the various approaches can be exemplified through a critical analysis of some features 
of Robert Brandom's philosophical conception. Brandom has utilized the pragmatico-normative model of deontic 
"score-keeping"
25
 – which as such is a model to explain how the assigning and undertaking of deontic commitments in 
language games comes about – to clarify the structure of recognitive interaction. To that end, in his article ‘Some 
Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism’ (1999) Brandom began by drawing up a model (which I shall call model I) in 
which recognitive powers are assimilated to linguistic-type deontic powers and thus come to mark a sharp discontinuity 
between animality and humanity on the one hand and between naturality and normativity on the other. Furthermore, in 
Brandom's model normative pragmatics is, rather, a model for semantic analysis and is not linked up with a socio-
ontological conception, even though this step can be easily taken on the basis of the presuppositions of Making it 
Explicit. Finally, from the fact that normative pragmatics is also detached from a naturalistic and anthropological 
approach, it follows that in Brandom's position individual deontic powers are reduced to socially authorized formal 
powers and appear to have no basis in the nature and in the ontology of individuals and of their functions and capacities. 
In the final analysis the pragmatics of deontic score-keeping appears to analyze a certain class of recognitive 
interactions, but cannot in itself account for the recognitive powers that make them possible: since, if it too were to 
explain the constitution of the phenomenon of linguistic self-consciousness, it would leave the nexus between deontic 
authority and the recognitive capacities of individuals presupposed and unexplained. (Could just anyone be socially 
authorized to exercise the deontic power of recognizing norms, or are there certain characteristics – abilities, 
dispositions to develop capacities – that have to be satisfied by the beings that can exercise this status?) 
 
XVI. On Brandom's Pragmatics: Model II 
 
Some of these difficulties appear to be tackled by Brandom in his more recent article ‘The Structure of Desire and 
Recognition’, included in this collection, in which he develops a model I shall call it model II) of analysis of recognition 
that is rather different from model I. Here, Brandom reconstructs the transition, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, from 
desire (Begierde) to self-consciousness. The phenomenon of self-consciousness thus comes to be explained as a 
reflexive form of recognition that results from the application of the triadic structure of desiring consciousness to itself. 
In desiring consciousness there are in fact distinguishable (i) an attitude toward the object – for example hunger; (ii) a 
responsive activity motivated by that attitude – eating; and (iii) a significance – responding to the object by treating it in 
a certain way, i.e. attributing it the significance of food. Desiring consciousness is thus understood as a sort of erotic 
  
awareness – a form of primitive intentionality – that carries out a certain type of practical classification/evaluation of 
the environment.
27
 Moreover, this desiring consciousness is conceived by Brandom as a disposition to respond 
differentially to objects and is distinguished from mere behavioral dispositions to react in a certain way – for example, 
iron's disposition to react to a humid environment by rusting – insofar as the assessment of the effect of the action and 
thus of the reliability of the response can modify the attitude and the activities of the agent in case the object does not 
satisfy the desire (for example if the object classified as food leads to poisoning). This practical classification would 
thus not have a deterministic but rather a hypothetical-dispositional character. Recognitive powers, resulting from the 
reflexive self-application of that causal structure, would thus appear to be conceived as second-order dispositions – 
dispositions to endorse the dispositions of others – that imply a change in the first-order dispositions and thus the 
endorsement of a normative attitude. In this sense Brandom’s model II defines "simple recognition" as the disposition to 
attribute to the other the significance of desiring consciousness – which already implies the second-order disposition to 
endorse the normative authority of the other's desire – and "robust recognition" as the disposition to attribute to the 
other a desiring consciousness capable in turn of recognizing – which in turn implies the second-order disposition to 
endorse the normative authority of its recognitions. Even though the notion of desiring consciousness is of a naturalistic 
type, the transition from it to reflexive self-consciousness is nonetheless interpreted by Brandom in a sense that 
postulates, as in model I, a discontinuity between natural dispositions and cultural dispositions of a normative type. The 
problem of the relationship between recognitive capacities and deontic authority seems to remain unresolved, as does 
the need – which model II would appear to take into greater consideration – to give a base to recognitive powers in the 
nature and in the ontology of individuals.  
In my view a broaching of the categories of first and second nature would be profitable here for an understanding of the 
relation between the two levels of awareness and their relative dispositions. The second-order dispositions could in fact 
be conceived on the Hegelian model of habit qua second nature. This ought to be accompanied by a broaching of the 
distinction, already employed by Hegel in his Jena writings, of two levels of recognition (first natural and second 
natural or spiritual recognition) whose dialectic can – in my opinion – more adequately describe the complex relation 
between first and second nature.
28
 The very notion of normativity would prove to be modified in this new framework, 
since the second-nature normativity of simple and robust recognition (spiritual recognition, in Hegelian terms) ought to 
be understood as the development of a functional type of natural normativity, to which would thus correspond a form of 
first-nature recognition; furthermore, a non-dualistic approach would be reinforced by the fact that second nature 
habituation is not only a human phenomenon and can thus be conceived as something that occurs also within the animal 
kingdom (and this for Hegelian reasons too).
29
 To the different levels of awareness ought to correspond also different 
levels of normativity, according to an idea that, at bottom, is also closer to the overall design of Hegelian 
Naturphilosophie, in which the concept to which an organism has to adequate itself is the natural norm that it has to 
satisfy, i.e. its intrinsic functional norm.
30
 Brandom, by contrast, in placing normativity on the merely historico-cultural 
side, does not even fully account for that evaluative activity – the monitoring of the effects of one's actions that may 
lead to a change in one's attitudes – which is already intrinsic in his notion of desiring consciousness and which in 
Hegelian Naturphilosophie has its antecedent in Gefühl.
31
 At this point, however, recognitive powers themselves should 
no longer be modeled tout court on linguistic-type deontic powers: under this aspect model I appears to be in conflict 
with some consequences that, as we see it, could be dealt with by model II. In conclusion, note that if the practical 
classification – the assigning of functions – has a basis in the agents' natural dispositions, then it is part of their 
objective ontological constitution: and this also reopens the question – which goes back to the Hegelian critique of 
  
Kantian teleological judgment, and which constitutes the basis of the idea that there is also a functional type of natural 
normativity – of whether functions are only subjectively attributed – as Searle and Brandom insist – or whether they are 
constitutive aspects of reality. 
 
XVII. Perception or attribution? Realism or constructivism?  
 
There is, then, a further question that concerns the analysis of recognitive interactions and thus also the pragmatics of 
recognition. I am referring to the alternative between the attributive and the perceptive models that appear to comprise 
many formulations of such analysis, lining up with one model or with the other.
32
 The alternatives can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
1. Perceptive model: recognizing consists in reacting to properties already given and perceived as real. 
2. Attributive model: it is the act of attributing such properties that constitutes them as such. The act of attribution 
confers or attributes a property that was not there before. 
 
The alternatives could be translated in epistemological terms into: 
 
a. Realism: the properties of recognitive phenomena are real properties of objects, i.e. properties that exist 
independently of social construction. 
b. Constructivism: recognitive properties are constructed socially. 
 
Brandom's first model appears to position itself in the second family, which in its radical versions can give rise to 
versions à la Goffmann. But then also Brandom's second model, despite its recourse to the notion of disposition – which 
contains the idea that one is disposed to react to something – appears to line up on the constructivist side. In fact 
recognitive dispositions are according to Brandom dispositions to perform attributions
33
 – dispositions to attribute to 
something the status of normative agent – and are not commensurate with properties of the objects to which one reacts. 
Searle's model, too, would appear to come within this family, insofar as it claims that status functions are imposed on 
objects: but, here, there is a great deal more to be said. We also note how the alternative between the two models 
generates a sort of paradox of recognition analogous to Euthyphro's paradox:
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 Is something X because it is recognized 
as X, or is something recognized as X because it is X? 
 
XVIII. Limits of the alternative 
 
The truth of the matter is that the alternative is poorly framed. To delve into the question we need to bring out some of 
the limits of each position. 
 
1. Limits of the attributive approach. This approach in the first place does not appear to be applied equally to all 
recognitive phenomena, and in particular to those that run along the axis of perceptive identification and that appear to 
presuppose a reaction to properties that are at least perceived as real. On the other hand this axis is always intersected 
by the other two axes of self-recognition and of reciprocal recognition. And this cannot but have some consequence for 
  
the definition of the conditions of appropriateness of recognition also along the second and third axes: even though 
attestation and social construction have great effect here, the attribution of status is itself never detached from the 
arising of forms of immediate recognition in the form both of first-nature recognition (if erotic awareness is part of the 
metaphysical structure of certain entities, as Brandom appears to claim
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, then also simple recognition and robust 
recognition are reactions to properties given and perceived as real) and in the second-nature form of seeing as (for 
example, I cannot attribute you with a social stigma or a privilege without also seeing you as something already 
determined – this or that individual, person, human being... – on which I impose this and that other function).
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In the second place, at least some ways of understanding the attributive approach in a strong constructivist and anti-
realistic sense seem rather implausible. We have to observe that the idea that individual recognitive powers have 
constitutive character and contribute to the constitution of social phenomena does not mean that it is the singular act 
with which I as an individual impose a status, confer a property, that creates ex nihilo that property itself: it is the 
recognitive relations produced through individual powers and incorporated in the second nature of the habits of 
interaction that are constitutive. Furthermore, the individuals that with their constitutive powers intervene to constitute 
social phenomena – including such phenomena as self-consciousness and the legal person – also perceive these traits as 
real, as characteristics of the world, through their perceptive powers. Even if such individuals were systematically 
mistaken in observing these characteristics as real – as the constructivist may argue – their subjective constitutive 
powers would be nevertheless objective features of them as living, first natural beings, and would deploy processes and 
relations of systematic mistake that come to exist objectively in the world. Thus, the being of the features so produced 
depends not only on the appropriate subjective attitudes but also on appropriate objective features of the world, since on 
the one hand the being of these attitudes depends itself on the appropriate, objective properties of those first natural 
individuals, and on the other hand the attributive activity is always confronted with already given (even if partly 
imposed) properties of the objects. 
 
2. Limits of the perceptive approach. The perceptive approach, on the other hand does not appear capable of giving a 
full account of recognitive phenomena in which an essential role is played by performance itself, by the added value of 
the very act of recognizing: the will to self-attestation, the modalities of expression of the recognition of others play an 
influential role in determining the characteristics of what comes to be recognized and the quality of the relation (for 
example in self-recognition, which is always also production of one's own identity). In recognition, the reaction to what 
is there – even if not in all cases – is also an act through which what is there proves to be further determined, specified, 
expressed. 
 
XIX. An expressivist model?  
 
In conclusion I would like to explore the hypothesis that an expressivist model of recognition, if adequately conceived, 
can contribute to solving the paradox. In this sense recognitive powers – at least those that follow the second and third 
axes – ought to be understood first of all as expressive powers: and the ontologically constitutive character of 
recognition itself ought to be linked up with expressive powers and with their imaginative roots. From this standpoint it 
may be claimed that: 
 
  
1. There are individual powers, connected with first-nature natural endowments that are enabled and exercised through 
social interaction, on the basis of an educational context. 
2. Unconscious recognitive interaction, in which these powers are developed and exercised, contributes to the 
constitution of higher-level recognitive phenomena of a self-conscious and linguistic type. 
3. Recognition is an expressive labor of determination and of making explicit of the implicit: in this sense it is always 
the expression of something that is given but in an indeterminate form and whose determination is not independent of 
the labor of determination; the expressive labor consists in this contribution to the ontological determination of aspects 
of reality rather than in a creatio ex nihilo. This, in the final analysis, would be an expressivist ontology, i.e. an 
ontological model that incorporates the expressive work of determination as a feature that is both subjective and 
objective. 
 
XX. Epistemological realism 
 
We can also venture a response, then, to the alternative between realism and constructivism. Nothing, in fact, obliges us 
to link the perceptive model to some form of ontological realism. The fact that we perceive certain traits of persons and 
of society as real, and the very fact that such traits are objectively accessible, does not in itself justify the assumption of     
some extended ontological realism on the basis of which all these realities would be in themselves metaphysically 
determined independently of social interaction. The fact that many properties are not independent of collective 
intentionality and of recognitive interactions – their ontological intersubjectivity – is perfectly compatible with a form 
of epistemological realism, on the basis of which these properties are experienced as real by individuals or, in Searle's 
terms, are epistemologically objective. The ontological intersubjectivity of such properties clearly does not mean that 
they depend for their existence on the recognitive acts of an isolated subject. But this has also to mean that, if we speak 
of epistemological realism in the proper sense, individuals, whose recognitive powers concur in constituting social 
phenomena, have to be able to perceive, individually, the so-constituted phenomena as real. Hence the intentional 
constitution of reality through recognitive attribution – which comes about for the most part at the level of collective 
and unconscious intentionality, or at the level of a social productive imagination – is compatible with the idea that we 
really perceive the aspects of social reality so-constituted. 
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